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In recent years, we have seen quite a few large catastrophes, ranging from natural 
disasters to pandemics, have a huge impact on the lives of everyday Americans. In particular, the 
devastating effects of the Coronavirus have shown how important it is to prepare for these 
catastrophes. Both insurance and reinsurance companies must ensure they can transfer some of 
the risk of these low-frequency, high-severity events to other entities. However, it is difficult to 
know how much risk-sharing is needed, considering it is tough to predict future catastrophes. 
Therefore, this paper analyzes the effects of catastrophes on the insurance and reinsurance 
markets, explores different methods that are used to manage catastrophic losses, and investigates 
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Catastrophes in General 
 Insured property losses in the United States from natural catastrophes skyrocketed in 
recent years, going from $34.1 billion in 2016 to $137.4 billion in 2017 and $62 billion in 2018. 
The cause of this is the clear increasing trend of high-cost disasters. Within the last five years, 
there have been increasing several of high-severity disasters that cost tens of billions of dollars in 
losses (“Facts + Statistics”). 
 In 2020 alone, natural catastrophe losses reached $95 billion. Some of the costliest 
catastrophes during this time were Hurricane Laura and the Western wildfires (Smith). Not to 
mention, the Coronavirus resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, while the U.S. economy 
faltered. The GDP experienced an all-time high quarterly decline of 9.1% in the second quarter 
of 2020 while the unemployment rate skyrocketed to 14.8%, an all-time high, in April of 2020 
(Bauer et al.). 
 In recent years, severe thunderstorms are the natural disasters that have resulted in the 
most overall losses. In 2019 alone, they accounted for $27 billion of the $49.9 billion total 
natural catastrophe losses, which is around 54% of the total. This trend has been true since back 
in 1980, as meteorological events have been the costliest disasters since that time. They are 
followed by climatological events such as droughts or forest fires and then by hydrological 
events such as floods (Smith). 
 Although there have been increasing catastrophe losses in recent years, the capital 
amounts of insurance and reinsurance markets have remained rather stable year to year. This is 
especially true in the Property & Casualty realm, as they still had around $2 trillion in capital at 





Insurers use this capital as a safety net in case they take on higher losses than premiums can 
cover. However, it is probable that reinsurance contracts will begin to be renewed at higher rates 
soon since a few more years of massive losses could put a strain on the insurance market 
(Morris). 
 Reinsurance is the main method of risk transfer that insurance companies use to help deal 
with possible catastrophic losses. Reinsurance is the transfer of catastrophe risk from one 
insurance company to another. Typically, insurance companies will purchase insurance from 
other insurance companies. When this occurs, the purchaser is considered the primary insurer 
and the seller is considered the reinsurer. The purpose of reinsurance is to share risk with several 
different companies, thus decreasing the overall effect of catastrophes (von Dahlen and von Peter 
23). However, even with reinsurance, there are times in which the risk is so large that it could 
expose the entire insurance industry. For example, if a large hurricane were to decimate a huge 
city, such as Los Angeles, the damage could possibly reach into the realm of hundreds of billions 
of dollars.  
 This brings up a potential issue: what if reinsurance is not even enough to handle certain 
risks? Since some areas are more prone to catastrophes and extreme losses may result in 
insolvencies for different insurance companies, we often see insurers simply deciding not to 
underwrite certain risks. For example, a company may decide not to underwrite hurricane 
insurance in Florida, since that state is prone to hurricane damage. Also, some companies have 
switched their risk exposure, writing shorter term policies or claims-made policies (claims that 
are only covered if they are reported within the policy’s life). However, if insurance companies 
make these changes, they run the risk of drying out reinsurance markets, which would, in turn, 





 Another possible option to deal with very high-severity risks may be for insurers and 
reinsurers to raise their rates. However, there are two issues with this. First, there are numerous 
regulatory constraints placed on insurance and reinsurance companies that would make this very 
difficult. Second, since insurers are typically risk averse, the premium they would have to charge 
to take on this risk would be quite expensive and too high for many others to be willing to pay 
(Cutler and Zeckhauser 236). 
 There are two other important issues involved with catastrophe reinsurance: adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection is the possibility that either the primary insurer or 
the reinsurer has more information about the risk than the other. Typically, primary insurers will 
already have a risk held in their portfolio, so they are more knowledgeable about it and have 
more experience with it then a reinsurer would. If the insurer then wants to buy reinsurance to 
protect themself, the ideal seller would be a company whose portfolio largely does not include 
that risk, since adding this new risk to the portfolio would result in increased diversification for 
the seller. Therefore, the seller will most likely not have much experience with the risk, which 
could cause them to get stuck on the bad side of the deal (Cutler and Zeckhauser 235). 
 Luckily, in recent years, reinsurers have been able to build statistical models to predict 
catastrophic risks and gain more information into the risks they may be reinsuring. Therefore, 
adverse selection has become a bit less of a concern, as reinsurers are now better equipped to 
come up with competitive market prices. However, a primary insurer’s private information could 
still help them decide when they should purchase the reinsurance, helping them to possibly take 
advantage of the reinsurer (Cutler and Zeckhauser 235-236). 
 The other important issue mentioned above is moral hazard. This occurs when an 





they are performing appropriate loss mitigation tactics. Since it is costly for reinsurers to monitor 
the activities of the primary insurer and how they settle claims, primary insurers will sometimes 
be too relaxed with their loss mitigation activities. This is a moral hazard because although it 
seems to be morally wrong to not take the catastrophe losses seriously, it could possibly be 
beneficial to the primary insurer if they have hedged the right tail of their exposure through 
reinsurance. If an extreme catastrophe were to hit, the brunt of the burden would fall on the 
reinsurer and not the primary insurer. This used to be a big risk in reinsurance, but now with the 
introduction of securitized insurance instruments, a good portion of the right tail exposure risk 
now falls on the overall market (Doherty and Smetters). 
 There are several methods to help deal with moral hazard. The most common one is the 
use of loss sensitive premiums by reinsurers. This type of premium is not determined until the 
actual losses are in effect during the plan period, so if moral hazard occurs, the primary insurer 
will have to pay for it with higher premiums. Another method is monitoring. Reinsurers will 
often monitor the activities of the primary insurer to ensure they are performing risk mitigation 
tactics and not trying to cause a moral hazard. This is a relatively cheap practice if it occurs 
between affiliates (Doherty and Smetters). 
Broad View of the Insurance & Reinsurance Markets 
Companies in the insurance industry typically take on different types of risk mitigation 
efforts. The most common form of risk mitigation in the insurance industry is risk-sharing. This 
is typically done through either retrocession or securitization. Retrocession is simply the process 





catastrophe risk from primary insurers, they need to be able to then mitigate that risk by buying 
insurance from another company or entity (von Dahlen and von Peter 23). 
 Another risk-sharing technique used by the insurance industry is securitization. This is 
the process of issuing insurance liabilities to the broad financial market, thus extending some 
catastrophe risk to the entire market. A common insurance liability is a catastrophe bond. These 
bonds are issued to other financial institutions, such as banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, or 
pension funds. They are sometimes attractive investments because of the high interest rates they 
pay and the diversification they provide to portfolios, considering their risk is random and 
uncorrelated with other economic risks. Also, catastrophes are so rare that it is unlikely an 
investor would suffer the consequences. However, it is important to note that in this case, if a 
catastrophe does occur and the counterparty is unable to pay the full amount, the remaining 
liability then falls on the insurer (von Dahlen and von Peter 32). 
 However, even with these risk mitigation efforts, the insurance industry still experiences 
many effects from catastrophes. First, of course, a particular insurer may not be able to cover the 
losses from catastrophes, even after risk-sharing methods. This is sometimes the case because 
catastrophe risks are unlike any other risk insurance companies face daily. Instead of the typical 
small risks that can be predicted based on experience, catastrophes are large, rare events that are 
very difficult to predict. This can sometimes lead to insurance companies taking on much more 
risk than their premiums were priced to cover. Next, catastrophes can often have a big influence 
on the rate structure of firms. Especially in areas where catastrophes are more common, 
insurance companies will charge higher premiums, thus resulting in very low loss rates during 
years in which a catastrophe does not occur. This rate change must be made because during the 





influence affects both struggling and strong insurance companies at the same time, as 
catastrophes are events that are large enough to make a company go bankrupt (Born and Viscusi 
56).  
 Another effect of catastrophes on the insurance industry comes from the fact that the 
distribution of catastrophe loss is very unstable. There are many non-constant factors that may 
cause this, including locational and weather patterns. For example, beachline locations that are 
often hit with natural disasters will increase their construction to mitigate the effects of these 
disasters. Thus, their catastrophe loss distribution will change, making it very difficult for 
insurance companies to model it accurately. Also, insurance companies are constantly learning 
about catastrophe risk as they go along, which can affect the loss distribution as well (Born and 
Viscusi 56). 
 Although most of the effects of catastrophes are more common in the Life or Property & 
Casualty fields, there have also been studies that show these catastrophes can have an impact on 
Medicare costs, particularly for the states most susceptible to catastrophes. In a study funded by 
the National Academies of Sciences Gulf Research Program, a team of four doctors looked at the 
correlation between catastrophes and changing Medicare expenditures for the susceptible states 
in the U.S. Gulf Coast. In the study, they compared Medicare expenditure data from residents of 
the U.S. Gulf Coast with that of residents of other regions of the U.S. These doctors were able to 
conclude from the study that in general, total Medicare expenditures were higher for those areas 
with large catastrophe exposure. They found that inpatient Medicare expenditures (Medicare Part 
A) were lower for those areas with high catastrophe exposure, while home health expenditures 
(covered under Medicare Part B) were highest for those with high catastrophe exposure. One 





coverage for home health care so that they do not have to leave their homes. Likewise, 
individuals may be evacuating their home and travelling away, thus being forced to postpone 
their care (Horney et al.).   
 This study also found that Medicare expenditures in high exposure areas were down 
between 20% and 45% during the year of a major disaster and down 34% to 64% during the year 
after a major disaster. This indicates that catastrophes can sometimes destroy healthcare 
infrastructure, and thus a whole provider, in certain areas (Horney et al.). This is devastating for 
many elderly individuals who rely on Medicare coverage.  
Pandemics and Covid-19 
 Pandemics can have a massive impact on insurance companies. They are extremely hard 
to predict and prepare for, so their effects can sometimes be felt for many years. Although large-
scale pandemics are quite rare, 2020 showed us just how important it is to be ready to respond to 
new threats. The Coronavirus pandemic has had a big impact on the entire economic 
environment and specifically the insurance market.  
 Before diving into the ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic, it is important to 
understand the typical impact of pandemics on the insurance industry. Consequences to the 
insurance industry typically come in the form of either a severe economic downturn or an 
increased number of claims. An economic recession could have several consequences. First, the 
demand for insurance products may increase dramatically both before and during the pandemic, 
as people are rushing to get coverage. Second, a bad economy could result in insurance 
companies’ funds being managed less efficiently. Since the capital markets would be riskier, 





cause insurance companies to lose out on positive investment opportunities. In terms of claims, 
the death claims resulting from pandemics in the United States alone could range anywhere from 
$31 billion - $133 billion. However, a good portion of pandemic risk is typically reinsured, 
which means some of the mortality shock during pandemics would be taken on by reinsurers 
(van Broekhoven et al. 16).  
 Indeed, pandemics typically have a big effect on life reinsurers as well. These reinsurers 
usually do not have as much risk diversification as other reinsurers who cover a wide range of 
services. Reinsurers who concentrate on mostly mortality risk will usually be hit hard by 
pandemics. However, they can diversify themselves a bit by taking on other types of products, 
such as disability or critical illness. Another option they could use to mitigate risk is to move 
some of the mortality risk to the market through mortality bonds or other financial instruments 
(van Broekhoven et al. 21). 
 Pandemics can also have an impact on health insurance. Since morbidity rises during a 
pandemic, policyholders will be using more sickness benefits that are covered in their health 
insurance. Thus, there will be more claims and since medical services will be used more 
frequently during and after a pandemic, medical expenses will typically rise. Additionally, 
pandemics could cause spending due to hospitalization to increase since more people will be 
spending time in hospitals. However, there is a cap to this rise in claims and expenses: they are 
limited by the capacity of hospitals and the medical industry. Finally, the solvency margins of 
health insurance companies are lower than that of life insurance companies. Therefore, it is 
easier for solvency issues to arise in health insurance due to increased morbidity than it is in life 





 Now that we know some typical effects of pandemics on the insurance and reinsurance 
industries, we can take a deeper look at the Coronavirus pandemic. Possibly the most important 
impact of the pandemic on insurance companies came from its effect on the entire economic 
environment. Specifically, how have the growth and profitability prospects for insurers’ 
portfolios been affected? A recent study by the Insurance Information Institute has shown that 
the impact of Covid-19 on the insurance industry is most likely deeper than the current 
consensus. Their report added that global GDP growth is something that will take a big hit from 
the pandemic (Shaw). 
 Massive interest rate declines have proved to be detrimental for the insurance industry, as 
well, particularly for the life insurance and annuity sectors. Since both sectors rely on rate-
sensitive investments that match maturities with their long-term policies to keep their operations 
running, these interest rate declines have hurt them the most. To help deal with these low interest 
rates, life insurance and annuity insurers are modifying their products to lower guaranteed rates, 
since they may not be making enough money in their investments to keep supplying their normal 
products (Shaw). 
 The volatility of the equity markets during the pandemic has caused problems for the 
insurance industry, specifically in the United States. Since Property & Casualty insurers hold 
more in liquid assets to prepare for catastrophic losses, this is especially concerning for them. 
Twenty-three percent of the assets of Property & Casualty insurers were in stocks in 2018, 
compared to a mere two percent for life insurers (Shaw). 
 For companies that offer health insurance, the Coronavirus has had a negative impact on 
claim reserves, premium collectability, and future ratemaking. Since the number of health 





collection has not been as high. This means that they do not have as much money to finance their 
future claim payments. Furthermore, there has been a lot of pressure on the premium deficiency 
reserve, which actuaries calculate as the amount needed by an insurer if unearned premiums are 
not sufficient to meet future claims and expenses (Okpewho). Next, because of the virus, 
individuals and employers may delay their premium payments to reserve cash, which would hurt 
the revenue of health insurers. Also, it seems as though the increased unemployment will result 
in a decreased demand for health insurance, as most people get health insurance through their 
employer. This also hurts the income of health insurers. Finally, the Coronavirus has made it 
very difficult to predict the correct premium rates to charge policyholders in future years, since 
there is still much uncertainty surrounding whether there will be another wave of the virus, 
whether services that have become overwhelming underused should be eliminated, and whether 
those who contracted the virus may feel long-term effects of it. Not to mention, there is great 
uncertainty surrounding the cost of Coronavirus-related treatments in the coming years 
(Okpewho). 
 Adding to the detrimental impact of the virus on health care, it is already being reported 
that many hospitals and primary care doctors may not survive the pandemic. Hospitals are being 
forced to postpone their elective surgeries and other treatments that bring in the bulk of their 
revenue, thus forcing them to lay off some workers to stay in business. Although larger hospitals 
that have the capital and reserves to survive the pandemic will most likely bounce back, there are 
quite a few smaller hospitals and primary care establishments that may be forced to close due to 
the pandemic. For example, rural hospitals depend on their outpatient services for most of their 
revenue, but many of these services had to be put on hold during the virus. Additionally, these 





magnitude of Covid-19. Before the virus even reached the United States, one in four rural 
hospitals were on the brink of closure. If these hospitals go under, rural resident may not have 
access to much needed healthcare in their area for some time (Scott). 
 Another consequence of the pandemic was the loss of employer-sponsored insurance 
(ESI). In fact, there are studies showing that as many as 16.2 million American workers may 
have lost their ESI. Only about one half of the people who lost a job covered by ESI retained 
their coverage. The manufacturing and health care industries were the ones most likely to 
continue paying premiums for employees who were laid off, while the accommodation and food 
services industry was unlikely to do so (Fronstin and Woodbury). 
 Looking at all these adverse effects of the pandemic, some people wonder why the 
insurance industry was not better prepared to handle the consequences. Considering that Covid-
19 is the seventh pandemic or epidemic of the 21st century, many people wonder why the 
industry seemed to be caught off guard. In the past, insurers have issued endorsements on 
pandemics or epidemics immediately so that they would not have to pay out massive amounts of 
money due to their claims. However, with the Covid-19 pandemic, some policyholders 
purchased additional insurance from insurers (if this was allowed by their policy) for “losses 
arising from communicable diseases” before the time in which insurers began universally 
inserting a Covid-19 exclusion in their plans (Giller). Due to this, insurers have tried to sneak in 
Covid-19 exclusions after communicable disease coverage had already been paid for without the 
exclusion clause. However, state regulations do not allow this behavior. After a policy has been 
negotiated, secured, and paid for through premiums, the insurer cannot limit that coverage. 





who purchased additional disease coverage prior to the Coronavirus officially becoming the 
headline of every news outlet in early 2020 (Giller). 
 Additionally, lawmakers are attempting to force insurance companies to pay large sums 
of money to cover Coronavirus-related claims, even though most policies do not cover 
pandemics. Lawmakers are trying to put into place business interruption policies, so that 
insurance companies must pay out claims to small businesses that shut down because of the 
pandemic. Insurance companies will continue to fight against these lawmakers, as they know 
paying out this type of money would put a big dent in their ability to maintain their business 
operations. Instead, they are calling on their governments to provide subsidies to cover the losses 
to small businesses (Giller). 
Catastrophe Models 
 It is becoming increasingly important for insurance companies to be able to estimate 
losses and prepare for future catastrophes. Typical actuarial methods are unable to do this 
because of the scarcity of loss data and rarity of massive catastrophic events. Additionally, the 
loss data that does exist is rather unreliable since the insurance landscape is always changing. 
Risk mitigation tactics, the cost of repairs, and property values are not constant factors 
(“Modeling Extreme Event Risk” 2).  
 Therefore, the insurance industry has been looking into catastrophe models to help with 
their decision-making. Catastrophe models are computer programs that are meant to replicate the 
characteristics of catastrophes. They can be created for many events, including natural disasters, 
terrorism, cyber-attacks, and pandemics. They were first introduced in the 1980s and have been 





event in the life of catastrophe models was Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which brought major 
losses after several years with little hurricane activity. This helped lead to the insurance 
industry’s adoption of catastrophe models (“Catastrophe Models”).   
The purpose of catastrophe models is to inform insurers where future catastrophic events 
are likely to occur and how intense they will most likely be. They estimate a range of direct, 
indirect, and residual losses based on a pre-determined loss distribution. Direct losses are those 
such as damage to buildings and other structures. Indirect losses refer to business interruptions, 
loss of the usage of certain items, and an increase in living expenses. Residual losses come from 
inflation in the cost of materials, a sharp increase in demand, and labor delays (“Catastrophe 
Models”).  
 Catastrophe models consist of four basic modules, regardless of what type of catastrophe 
they are modelling: the event, intensity, vulnerability, and financial modules. The event module 
generates possible catastrophic event scenarios based on historical data. The intensity module 
looks at different geographic regions of each simulated event to determine the level of physical 
hazard that is appropriate. The vulnerability module considers both the scenario and intensity 
from above to quantify the damage that is expected to occur. Finally, the financial module 
measures the loss from the already determined damage estimates. This is where different policies 
are considered, such as those with deductibles and limits (“Catastrophe Models”). 
 There are a few important metrics included in catastrophe models. These include the 
exceedance probability (EP) curve, the probable maximum loss (PML), and the average annual 
loss (AAL). The EP curve measures the probability of exceeding different annual loss amounts, 
laid out in a graph. The PML is the annual probability that a certain pre-determined loss 





insurers are able to make up through their premium and investment revenue, as well as reserves. 
A loss amount beyond this threshold would usually have to be made up through reinsurance or 
another risk-sharing method mentioned earlier in this paper. The AAL is the area under the EP 
curve, or the average loss of the entire loss distribution (“Catastrophe Models”). 
 Catastrophe models must take into consideration several different factors and make 
assumptions. For example, recent natural disasters have highlighted the impact of demand surge, 
evacuation, and sociological risks on losses. Additionally, the hurricane seasons in 2004 and 
2005 helped catastrophe models incorporate the impact of secondary losses, such as secondary 
flooding during some hurricanes, into the models (“Catastrophe Models”). Furthermore, since 
input data is often underwhelming or missing, underlying assumptions must be made both in 
terms of frequency and severity for a model to produce any output. Often, catastrophe modelers 
will create their own event sets to simulate thousands of years’ worth of potential events to fill 
the gaps in historical data (“Understanding Uncertainty in Catastrophe Modelling for Non-
Catastrophe Modellers” 6). 
 Once modelers figure out the correct assumptions to use and consider all factors, they are 
finally able to run the model and utilize its output to perform several actuarial tasks. The output 
can be used for ratemaking, underwriting, loss mitigation, and catastrophe reinsurance. In terms 
of ratemaking, most policy terms are one year, so the annual cost of catastrophes is extremely 
important. The cost of the insurance policy includes the AAL, expenses, and risk load: Premium 
= AAL + Expense Load + Risk Load. The AAL is calculated as: AAL = ∑ 𝑝(𝑖)𝐿(𝑖)𝑖 , where p(i) 
is the annual probability of event (i) occurring and L(i) is the expected loss of event (i). The risk 
load must be included in the premium calculation to account for the degree of uncertainty in the 





to cover a catastrophic loss. It is typically calculated as the standard deviation of the losses in the 
model: σ = √∑ [𝑝(𝑖)𝐿(𝑖)2] −  𝐴𝐴𝐿2𝑖 . Finally, the Expense Load typically multiplies the sum of 
the AAL and the Risk Load by some constant to account for potential expenses brought on by 
catastrophes, such as additional living expenses (“Uses of Catastrophe Model Output” 12-13). 
 Catastrophe model output is also important in underwriting and risk selection. Insurance 
companies must be able to make informed decisions when determining which risks to undertake. 
They must consider the financial state they are in and which risks are best for their portfolio at a 
given time. This is where PML is typically considered, showing an underwriter a loss amount 
that is predicted to be exceeded with a certain probability in a period of one year. It is important 
for underwriters to consider the effects of adding an individual policy to what they already have 
in their portfolio, and if the PML of that risk is something the insurer can reasonably take on 
(“Uses of Catastrophe Model Output” 11). 
 Loss mitigation can also be enhanced by the output of a catastrophe model. In catastrophe 
models, you can use scenario analysis to understand how certain characteristics (such as 
hurricane shutters on a home) included in the model lessen or increase loss severity. Thus, the 
model can help show how AAL reacts when these characteristics are included in the model 
versus when they are not included. If certain characteristics lower the AAL or other metrics for a 
particular risk, then they can be used as loss mitigation features, helping to reduce premiums for 
insureds (“Uses of Catastrophe Model Output” 11). 
 Finally, the output from catastrophe models can be used for catastrophe reinsurance. 
Since primary insurers often need large sums of money as soon as possible after a catastrophic 





reinsurers. Catastrophe model output has included language and metrics that are common among 
primary insurers, reinsurers, and others, and therefore it makes the terms of transactions much 
easier to agree to (“Uses of Catastrophe Model Output” 12).  
Building a Hypothetical Model 
 I decided to experiment with finding the metrics above (AAL, PML, and EP curve) using 
hypothetical frequency and severity distributions. From my research, I found that the most 
common frequency and severity distributions used in loss models are Poisson and Gamma, 
respectively. I found that a Poisson distribution with lambda equal to 1.8 was a reasonable model 
to simulate the frequency of hurricanes in a particular area. Additionally, after experimenting 
with different parameters for a severity distribution, I decided to use an alpha of 0.55 and a beta 
of 50,000. Obviously, true catastrophes may have higher or lower betas depending on geographic 
location, type of catastrophe, or other factors, since some catastrophic losses can reach as high as 
millions of dollars. However, the graph of the Gamma distribution I decided to use looked 
reasonable for this simulation, since most events resulted in small losses, with the occasional 
massive hurricane.  
 To perform the simulation, I used Microsoft Excel (the file is available upon request). I 
found the probability of there being anywhere between zero and ten hurricanes in a particular 
area over a period of one year. I did not go higher than ten events since the probability of having 
more than ten hurricanes in a year was only .0003%. Then, I simulated 10,000 different loss 
amounts from my severity distribution to use in the model. From this, I found the AAL by 





𝑃(𝑘 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟). Averaging the AAL from each of the 10,000 simulations, I 
found an Average AAL of around $50,000.  
 Further, I decided to add a risk load to the simulation because this is very common in 
real-world models. The uncertainty of catastrophic losses is what forces a risk load to be used in 
catastrophe models. For the risk load, I simply used the standard deviation of losses in the model, 
as described earlier in this paper. Then, the premium for each simulation was calculated as the 
AAL plus the risk load. Overall, the average premium for the 10,000 simulations was around 
$87,500, meaning the risk load accounted for about 42.7% of the total average premium.  
 After this, I moved on to the Exceedance Probability (EP) curve and the Probable 
Maximum Loss (PML) metric. Using “countif” and “count” formulas in Excel, I was able to find 
the probability that my simulated loss is greater than a particular value. Then, using this data, I 
created the EP curve shown below in Figure 1. As can be seen from the graph, the exceedance 
probability is high for smaller values, such as 1,000 or 10,000. However, once the loss amount 
values on the x axis become high, the exceedance probability decreases greatly.  
 Now, to determine PML, I needed to set a hypothetical threshold. This threshold is the 
amount that the primary insurer can pay out through their premium and investment revenue, as 
well as their reserve holdings. For the sake of this simulation, I set this threshold to be $180,000. 
Using Excel formulas again, I was able to find the PML (probability of the loss exceeding the 
threshold) to be 5.47%. This is an important metric for insurance companies because it can help 
them determine how much reinsurance they need to invest in so that they can cover these high 






Figure 1: Exceedance Probability Curve 
 
Although I did not have any original catastrophe data to fit frequency and severity models 
to, this simulation still gave me a great idea of important metrics that insurance companies use to 
make policy decisions. It helped me gain a better understanding of how these models would be 
made using computer software and showed how important it is to continue to improve 
catastrophe models for the future.  
Looking Ahead 
 As was made abundantly clear during my research, catastrophes have the power to bring 
a trail of devastation in their wake. However, there is confidence that risk mitigation efforts can 
be improved in the future. Catastrophe bonds, which are already performing well, will be even 


























von Peter 32). Likewise, the improved catastrophe experience will help shape these instruments 
into more enticing commodities.  
 There are also a few adjustments that the insurance markets need to make because of the 
Coronavirus pandemic. They need to adjust their cash flow plans, especially considering the 
weak state of the economy and the extremely low interest rates. They will also need to adjust 
their investment portfolios to account for the high equity market volatility and low rates. Lastly, 
insurance companies should adjust their budgets and implementation plans to account for 
possible future pandemics or large-scale catastrophes like this one. They need to make sure they 
have enough capital to handle another possible wave of claims (Shaw). 
 Another area that can be improved in the future is catastrophe models. Output from these 
models has already been used in many ways, but there is certainly potential for them to improve 
and become more accurate. Powerful computers are starting to allow catastrophe models to reach 
high levels of resolution and provide forecasts to particular geographic locations. However, with 
these higher resolutions also come higher uncertainty and sensitivity in the results. Thus, 
modelling vendors are beginning to move toward open models, which allow the components of 
the models to be more accessible to users. This also allows exposure data to be shared 
throughout the industry more easily. Furthermore, the validation process is significantly more 
efficient when dealing with open models (“Catastrophe Models”). 
 Furthermore, the catastrophe modelling industry can best move forward by finding ways 
to get better, more reliable data (which may only occur over time) and come up with better 
methodologies for interpolation and extrapolation. Extrapolation is extremely important in 





Sometimes, with catastrophes, the losses will be higher than the range of past observations, so 
extrapolation is crucial in terms of projecting these high losses. Furthermore, catastrophe 
modelling can be improved by focusing on geospatial accuracy, as this would reduce the number 
of false positives in the model and provide meaningful output for a geographic location 
(Farnham). 
Conclusion 
 It is obvious that catastrophes can wreak havoc on the lives of people all over the world. 
Thus, it is extremely important for insurance companies to be able to help individuals and 
corporations protect themselves against these massive losses. However, insurance companies 
need ways to help mitigate the losses that they could be taking on by writing catastrophe 
policies. Thus, insurance companies use reinsurance, retrocession, and securitization to protect 
themselves from right tail risks. Still, catastrophes have been known to affect the insurance and 
reinsurance markets in many ways, including influencing rate structure, damaging investment 
opportunities, and hitting very hard certain reinsurers who do not have sufficient diversification 
in their portfolio.  
A major example of a catastrophe affecting the insurance and reinsurance industries is the 
coronavirus pandemic. This epidemic has led to high unemployment rates, resulting in the loss of 
employer-sponsored healthcare. It has also resulted in delayed premium payments, which puts a 
strain on the income of certain insurers. Furthermore, the pandemic has resulted in the forced 
discontinuation of elective surgeries for health care establishments and the postponement of 
outpatient care. This is contributing to some smaller hospitals and health care establishments 





Thankfully, catastrophe models are becoming more successful estimators of catastrophic 
losses, allowing insurers to improve their decision-making in important areas of their business, 
including ratemaking, underwriting, loss mitigation, and reinsurance. Still, these models have 
room to grow, as technology improves and individuals find ways to incorporate geospatial 
accuracy and better extrapolation methods into their models. Additionally, securitization is 
trending in the right direction, as catastrophe bonds will continue to gain an improved market 
among investors and help insurers mitigate possible catastrophic losses. Finally, the Coronavirus 
pandemic has helped insurers realize how important it is to adjust their investment portfolios, 
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